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The Missing Desires Objection to Hybrid Theories of Well-Being

Abstract.  Many philosophers have claimed that we might do well to adopt a hybrid theory of well-being: a theory that incorporates both an objective value constraint and a pro-attitude constraint.  Hybrid theories are attractive for two main reasons.  First, unlike desire theories of well-being, hybrid theories need not worry about the problem of defective desires.  This is so because, unlike desire theories, hybrid theories place an objective value constraint on well-being.  Second, unlike objectivist theories of well-being, hybrid theories need not worry about being overly alienating.  This is so because, unlike objectivist theories, hybrid theories place a pro-attitude constraint on well-being.  However, from the point of view of objectivists, hybrid theories are not objectivist enough, and this can be seen clearly in missing desires cases.  For instance, hybrid theories entail that, if someone lacks the desire for health, then health is not a component of her well-being.  This, objectivists say, is implausible.  It is obvious, objectivists say, that someone’s life goes better for herself inasmuch as she is healthy, and hence that health is a component of her welfare.  This paper focuses on the missing desires objection (as leveled by objectivists) to hybrid theories of well-being.  My argument is that the missing desires objection can be answered in a way that is generally convincing and, in particular, in a way that pays a good deal of respect to objectivist intuitions about well-being.  My hope, then, is that this paper will help to persuade objectivists about well-being to become hybrid theorists.  

	Many philosophers have claimed that we might do well to adopt a hybrid theory of well-being: a theory that incorporates both an objective value constraint and a pro-attitude constraint (for some examples of hybrid theory proposals, see Parfit 1984, pp. 501-502; Griffin 1986, pp. 26-34; Adams 1999, pp. 93-101; Darwall 2002, pp. 73-104; and Olsaretti 2005, pp. 89-108).  Hybrid theories can take different forms, depending on the type of objective value that is relied upon, and depending on the type of pro-attitude that is relied upon.​[1]​  But, regardless of the differences among hybrid theories, they are all attractive for two main reasons.  First, unlike desire theories of well-being, hybrid theories need not worry about the problem of defective desires.  This is so because, unlike desire theories, hybrid theories place an objective value constraint on well-being.  Second, unlike objectivist theories of well-being, hybrid theories need not worry about being overly alienating.  This is so because, unlike objectivist theories, hybrid theories place a pro-attitude constraint on well-being.  
Notwithstanding the attractions of hybrid theories, one might find them problematic.  In particular, from the point of view of objectivists, hybrid theories are problematic because they are not objectivist enough.  This can be seen clearly in missing desires cases.  For instance, hybrid theories entail that, if someone lacks the desire for health, then health is not a component of her well-being.  This, objectivists say, is implausible.  It is obvious, objectivists say, that someone’s life goes better for herself inasmuch as she is healthy, and hence that health is a component of her welfare.  This paper will focus on the missing desires objection (as leveled by objectivists) to hybrid theories of well-being.  My argument will be that the missing desires objection can be answered in a way that is generally convincing and, in particular, in a way that pays a good deal of respect to objectivist intuitions about well-being.  My hope, then, is that this paper will help to persuade objectivists about well-being to become hybrid theorists.
	Five sections follow.  Section 1 will explain, first, what objectivist theories entail and why they are thought to suffer from the problem of alienation and, second, what desire theories entail and why they are thought to suffer from the problem of defective desires.  Section 2 will, first, lay out a certain hybrid theory – call it the desire-objectivism theory – and, second, lay out the missing desires objection (as leveled by objectivists) to the desire-objectivism theory.  Then sections 3 and 4 will be concerned with answering the missing desires objection to the desire-objectivism theory.  And, finally, section 5 will very briefly conclude the paper.   

1. Worries about objectivist theories and desire theories
	To understand the rationale behind hybrid theories, we should discuss the problem of alienation as it relates to objectivist theories and the problem of defective desires as it relates to desire theories.  Briefly, then, let us do this.
Start with objectivist theories of well-being.  It is common for objectivists to advance objective list theories (or OL theories), which assert that there is an authoritative list of goods that matter for human welfare.  Knowledge, accomplishment, friendship, health, pleasure, and aesthetic experience are all apt to be on this list.  Following various OL theorists, we can refer to the goods on the OL theory list as the basic goods.​[2]​  OL theories operate on two levels: the level of the basic goods and the level of the instances of the basic goods.  With regard to the level of the basic goods, OL theories entail that each basic good is a fixed component of each human’s well-being (where it is assumed that this holds true regardless of whatever desires each human has or lacks).  With regard to the level of the instances of the basic goods, OL theories entail that some (any) state of affairs, X, is a component of the well-being of some (any) human being, A, if and only if, and because, X instantiates one of the basic goods for A.  
	In arguing against objectivism, desire theorists tend to say things like this: ‘Well-being (or prudential value) should not be confused with other sorts of value.  Goodness simpliciter is obviously not the same as well-being, since it is not goodness for anyone or anything (except, perhaps, for the world).  Further, whereas morality primarily concerns, say, impartiality (as in the consequentialist tradition) or respect and constraint (as in certain deontological traditions), and whereas perfectionism primarily concerns someone’s living well or doing well as the kind of thing she is (that is, as a human being), prudence essentially focuses on the individual and her own attitudes, stances, and unique personality.  We should hold, then, that well-being is a distinctively personal sort of value.’  In saying that well-being is a distinctively personal sort of value, desire theorists are not merely claiming that the content of each person’s welfare is different.  OL theories can accommodate the fact that well-being is personal in this way.  After all, what instantiates accomplishment for a baby (learning how to walk, how to talk, etc.) will differ in certain respects from what instantiates accomplishment for any normally functioning adult, and what instantiates health for an elderly woman will differ in certain respects from what instantiates health for a teen-age boy.  Further, this fitting of instances of the basic goods to the individual (in a way that accords with the individual’s own talents, circumstances, physiology, life-history, etc.) holds not only for accomplishment and health, but for all of the basic goods.  Again, though, in claiming that well-being is a distinctively personal sort of value, desire theorists are not merely claiming that different things are prudentially good for different people, for here they are also claiming that what is prudentially good for someone must positively connect to her own psychology.  
In elaborating on this last claim, desire theorists tend to say things like this: ‘To attain adequacy, a welfare theory must embrace a relatively strong form of prudential internalism.​[3]​  Prudential internalism states that X cannot be a component of A’s welfare unless there is some sort of positive connection between X and A’s psychology.  The underlying thought here is that it simply cannot be true that there are things that are both prudentially good for A and thoroughly alienating to A.  In its most straightforward form prudential internalism asserts that, if X is a component of A’s welfare, then A must have some sort of pro-attitude toward X.  This version of prudential internalism may well be too strong.  But, all the same, some rather strong version of prudential internalism must be true.  Indeed, there must be some rather strong way in which anything that is prudentially good for A positively connects to A’s psychology.  OL theories fail precisely because they cannot accept any relatively strong form of prudential internalism.’
In response OL theorists might say that there is no problem with the claim that someone can be thoroughly alienated from aspects of her own welfare.  And here OL theorists might stress that in ordinary language we often say things like ‘this is good for you whether you like it or not’ and ‘I did not want to do it, but I must concede that doing it was good for me’.  But, while we do often say things like this, it seems that in these cases we are not talking about what is intrinsically good for us (or about well-being) – rather, we are only talking about what is instrumentally good for us.  Here is an example.  Someone might take medicine and then say that, although she did not like it or want to take it, it was still good for her to take it.  Notice, though, that what enters the content of her welfare is not her taking of the medicine, but rather the health or the healing that taking the medicine brings to her.  And she does want this health or healing.  Or again, if an athlete who trains painfully hard says that all the training was good for him even though he did not want to do it and did not enjoy doing it, his point is not that the state of affairs his training painfully hard entered the content of his welfare.  Rather, his point is that training painfully hard was instrumentally good for him in that it allowed him, say, to improve his muscle strength and to do well in his sport, where these latter things are what enter the content of his welfare, and where he does want these latter things.  My general point here, then, is just that it is remarkably hard to shake the intuition that X cannot be an aspect of A’s welfare unless there is some sort of positive psychological hookup between X and A.  Here we must remember that well-being is an intrinsic sort of value and that it carries with it a note of payoff, or benefit, or reward.  Further, we should acknowledge that, although this note of payoff, or benefit, or reward need not be understood as involving positive feelings (pleasure or enjoyment), it seems that it does need to be understood as involving some sort of positive psychological engagement (that is, some sort of pro-attitude).  
The above remarks are extremely brief, and they do not provide us with anything like a decisive case against objectivism about well-being.  Still, the above remarks do strongly suggest that human well-being is a pro-attitude dependent sort of value.  Accordingly, then, it seems that hybrid theorists have good reasons for placing a pro-attitude constraint on well-being.	
Turn now to desire theories.  There are two general sorts of desire theories: the sort that relies on the desires that one actually has and the sort that relies on the desires that one would have if certain conditions were to obtain.  There are, then, actual and hypothetical desire theories.  Both actual and hypothetical desire theories entail that the desires that determine one’s well-being are intrinsic or non-instrumental desires.​[4]​  (Throughout the rest of this paper, I will, to save words, use ‘desire’ to mean ‘intrinsic desire’.  When I speak of merely instrumental desires, I will be explicit that I am doing so.)  As for what a desire is, desire theorists are not always explicit about the view of desire that they are working with, but it is fair to say that desire theorists typically accept motivation-based views of desire: For A to desire X is for A to be intrinsically motivated to make X obtain; in other words, for A to desire X is for A to have some of her motivational force flowing to or directed at X itself.  With regard to merely instrumental desires, desire theorists can say that, if A has a merely instrumental desire for X, then A’s motivational force is not flowing to or directed at X itself – rather, A’s motivational force is flowing to or directed at something that X is thought to be an effective means to.​[5]​
The simplest possible actual desire theory says that X is a component of A’s well-being if and only if, and because, A desires X.  The problem of defective desires is the problem of our desiring things that, intuitively or pre-theoretically, do not seem to be intrinsically good for us.  We should be very careful when we are considering defective desires objections.  An objectivist about well-being might say: ‘We can imagine Jimmy’s desiring to eat razor blades, but Jimmy’s eating razor blades is obviously not intrinsically good for him. Thus the actual desire theory is absurd.’  This objection should be bracketed because it is fantastical.  It is far from clear that there has ever been a person who desires to eat razor blades, and, moreover, we really have no good evidence that this sort of case can occur in our world or environment or, more generally, in any world or environment that is relevantly like ours (say, one where the same laws of nature are operative, and where the history is substantially similar).  True, we do see actual people who perform self-destructive or bizarre activities – for instance, we see cutters, we see people who run into walls on purpose (we pad walls so that they do not get hurt), and we see people who eat dirt (think of pica cravings).  But all of these cases are psychologically complicated.  Do those who cut do so because they desire (or are intrinsically motivated) to do this?  Or, rather, do they do this simply because they desire help and view cutting as a way of getting people’s attention?  Do those who run into walls do so because they desire to do so?  Or, rather, do they do this simply because they desire social attention or help and view this as a way of getting people’s attention?​[6]​  And do those who eat dirt do so because they desire to eat dirt?  Or, rather, do they do this simply because they desire certain minerals that their body needs and that they instinctively (though perhaps falsely) believe to be contained in the dirt?  My general point here is that appealing to cases should not be an anything goes affair.  In particular, we should lay it down that we are allowed to appeal to a given case only if we have good evidence that it can occur in our world or environment or, more generally, in a world or environment that is relevantly like ours (one where the same laws of nature are operative, and where the history is substantially similar).  Call this the “non-fantasticality constraint”.  Defective desires objections that appeal to desires for eating razor blades, or desires for cutting, or desires for running into walls, or desires for eating dirt violate the non-fantasticality constraint because we do not have good evidence that people in our world or environment (or in worlds or environments that are relevantly like ours) can have desires such as these.  (It may be a psychological law that governs our world or environment and worlds or environments that are relevantly like ours that people cannot desire things such as these.)   
	The trouble for the actual desire theory is that there seem to be plenty of non-fantastical cases that involve defective desires.  It is, after all, commonplace for people to desire (or to be intrinsically motivated by) money, or fame, or other people’s suffering.  Does Donald Trump desire money?  Do various reality TV stars desire fame?  Do certain Ku Klux Klan members desire that African Americans suffer?  It seems clear in these cases that there are desires (or intrinsic motivations) present.  And these desires do seem defective, for, pre-theoretically, we are not inclined to think of money, fame, and the suffering of African Americans as things that can be intrinsically good for someone.  There are, to be sure, various responses that actual desire theorists might offer here.​[7]​  However, most desire theorists admit that it is best to abandon the actual desire theory project in favor of the hypothetical desire theory project, at least in part because actual desire theories seem to do poorly vis-à-vis defective desires objections.  
	Hypothetical desire theories can be formulated in different ways, but it is fairly standard for them to say that X is a component of A’s welfare if and only if, and because, A would desire X after having just been fully and vividly informed with respect to non-evaluative information.​[8]​  I am inclined to think that at least some defective desires would persist even in the face of one’s being fully and vividly informed.  
Consider two examples.  First, would Donald Trump lose his desire for money if he were vividly to internalize all of the relevant non-evaluative facts about money?  Trump seems already to be aware of all of the relevant non-evaluative facts about money.  So it seems unlikely that his vividly internalizing all of the relevant non-evaluative facts about money would cause any change in his beliefs about money.  But, if no change in Trump’s belief-set occurs here, then presumably no change in Trump’s desire-set will occur here either.  Second, would a deeply racist member of the Ku Klux Klan lose his desire for the suffering of African Americans if he were vividly to internalize all of the relevant non-evaluative facts concerning African Americans?  If his racism is largely grounded in false empirical beliefs about African Americans, then, yes, he presumably would lose this desire of his.  But, then again, his racism may largely be grounded not in false empirical beliefs, but rather in false evaluative beliefs that were taught to him at an early age (for instance, the false evaluative belief that “black people are bad or inferior”).​[9]​  And, in that case, it seems doubtful that fully and vividly informing this Klan member (with respect to non-evaluative information) would cause him to lose his desire for the suffering of African Americans.  
If only for the sake of argument, let us assume that hypothetical desire theories can successfully answer defective desires objections.  Even granting this, there is still a serious worry about hypothetical desire theories: the worry that a significant gap between the personalities of HA (hypothetical A) and A may open up, in which case an alienation problem may follow.  Think of the point this way.  At the beginning of the process of fully and vividly informing HA, HA’s personality is identical to A’s personality.  Further, the goal is to hold HA’s personality (or non-belief properties) constant as HA is being fully and vividly informed.  After all, HA is supposed to be the same person (personality-wise) as A.​[10]​  However, once the process of fully and vividly informing HA has ended, it may well be true that HA’s personality markedly differs from A’s.  Yet, if that is so, then HA may well desire various things that do not suit A and, indeed, to which A is thoroughly averse, in which case it follows on hypothetical desire theories that A is thoroughly alienated from various aspects of her own welfare.​[11]​  An example: If A is an open and trusting person, and if HA learns some disturbing fact while being fully and vividly informed – say, the fact that, for years now, his (A’s) wife has been having an affair with his (A’s) lifelong best friend – then HA may become a guarded and untrusting person, which in turn may well lead to HA’s desiring various things that do not suit A and, indeed, to which A is thoroughly averse.  
	The above remarks are extremely brief, and they do not provide us with anything like a decisive case against either actual or hypothetical desire theories.  Still, in light of the above remarks, we can see why hybrid theorists place an objective value constraint on well-being: Hybrid theorists do this in order to circumvent any and all worries concerning defective desires.

2. The desire-objectivism theory and the missing desires objection
In light of what was said in section 1, we can see that hybrid theories are attractive because they need not worry about the problem of defective desires or the problem of alienation.  The objective value constraint of hybrid theories eliminates the former problem, and the pro-attitude constraint of hybrid theories eliminates the latter problem.  
I will now advance a certain hybrid theory.  Call it the desire-objectivism theory (the DO theory).  As its name suggests, the DO theory relies on desire for its pro-attitude constraint.  For its objective value constraint, the DO theory relies on the basic goods (accomplishment, health, friendship, etc.).  However, whereas OL theorists conceive of the basic goods as prudential objective goods, the DO theory, in the first instance, conceives of the basic goods as non-prudential objective goods.​[12]​  I add ‘in the first instance’ because the DO theory entails that the basic goods can and do become prudential goods if they are desired.
Just as OL theories run on two levels, so too the DO theory runs on two levels: the level of the basic goods and the level of the instances of the basic goods.  With regard to the level of the basic goods, the DO theory says that any given basic good (be it accomplishment, or health, or friendship, etc.) is a component of A’s welfare if and only if, and because, A desires it.  And, to repeat, the basic goods are here being conceived of, in the first instance, as non-prudential objective goods.  With regard to the level of the instances of the basic goods, the DO theory says that X is a component of A’s welfare if and only if, and because, (1) X instantiates one of the basic goods for A (where, again, the basic goods are being conceived of, in the first instance, as non-prudential objective goods) and (2) X’s obtaining satisfies some desire that A has (with the idea being that, if A does not desire X itself, then A must at least desire the basic good that X here instantiates for A).  An example will clarify this just mentioned desire constraint.  Suppose that I desire aesthetic experience and that hearing some song instantiates aesthetic experience for me.  Even if I have no antecedent desire to hear this song (say, because I have never heard of this song and do not even know that it exists), my hearing this song nonetheless satisfies a desire that I antecedently have, namely, the desire for aesthetic experience.  Thus, as far as the fulfillment of this desire constraint goes, it is enough if one desires whatever basic good happens to be in question (one need not, in addition, desire the specific state of affairs that instantiates this basic good for oneself).  This is a nice feature of the DO theory.  It seems intuitively right to think that there are plenty of things that are intrinsically good for me (or that are prudentially fit for me) and yet that I do not desire, simply because I am entirely unaware of their existence.  The DO theory entails that these things are intrinsically good for me, provided that I desire the basic goods that these things instantiate for me.
Let me now turn to the missing desires objection (as leveled by objectivists) to the DO theory.  (In discussing this objection I will focus on the level of the basic goods, not on the level of the instances of the basic goods.)  Consider that, in objecting to hypothetical (or idealized) desire theories, Brink (who is an objectivist about well-being) says:   
If the process of idealization is purely formal or content-neutral, then it must remain a brute and contingent psychological fact whether suitably idealized subjects would care about things we are prepared, on reflection, to think valuable.  But this is inadequate, inasmuch as we regard intellectually and emotionally rich lives as unconditionally good and intellectually and emotionally shallow lives as unconditionally bad.  For a person with the normal range of intellectual, emotional, and physical capacities, it is a very bad thing to lead a simple and one-dimensional life with no opportunities for intellectual, emotional, and physical challenge or growth.  One’s life is made worse, not better, if, after informed and ideal deliberation, that is the sort of life to which one aspires (2006, pp. 390-391).
As applied to the DO theory, Brink’s missing desires objection would run roughly as follows.  The DO theory entails that the basic goods (knowledge, friendship, health, etc.) are part of one’s welfare only if, and only when, one happens to desire them.  But that seems implausible, for these goods seem to be (as Brink might put it) unconditionally part of one’s welfare.  Surely one’s life is richer or fuller (intellectually, emotionally, and physically) inasmuch as one engages in these goods, and so surely one’s life increases in well-being inasmuch as one engages in these goods.
Speaking generally, when OL theorists advance missing desires objections against either desire theories or hybrid theories, OL theorists tend to assume that desires are contingent occurrences such that there is nothing particularly odd going on if someone happens to lack the desire for one or more of the basic goods.  But there is, I am convinced, something deeply wrong with this assumption.  After all, there is something odd – indeed, something very odd – going on if someone happens to lack the desire for one or more of the basic goods.  
I will respond to the missing desires objection in a two-step manner.  The first step is to argue that the vast majority of humans have built-in, stable desires for the basic goods (I will argue for this in section 3 and much of section 4).  If this argument goes through, it will follow that the missing desires objection does not have anything like the sort of breadth of coverage that one might think it has.  In other words, if this argument goes through, it will follow that there are actually very few cases that involve non-desired basic goods.  Still, with regard to these very rare cases, I must have something to say on behalf of the DO theory (or, more generally, on behalf of hybrid theories of well-being).  This takes us to the second step of my response to the missing desires objection: I will argue (in the latter parts of section 4) that, with regard to those very rare cases where the desires for certain basic goods happen to be missing, we do not have sufficient reasons for thinking that these non-desired basic goods really are part of the welfare of the agents in question.  
One note about what follows: I will rely on a very rough distinction between standard and non-standard cases.  In speaking of standard cases, I mean to be speaking of cases that involve normally functioning human beings.  Thus, in speaking of standard cases, I mean to be ruling out cases involving people with psychological disorders.  Also, if an otherwise normally functioning human is, say, extremely introverted and happens never or almost never to pursue friendship, then I will count this case as a non-standard one.  I will discuss non-standard cases in section 4, but I will bracket them in section 3 – that is, I will only be discussing standard cases in section 3.   
  
3. Standard cases
Consider the basic goods – say, accomplishment, aesthetic experience, health, friendship, knowledge, and pleasure.  Doesn’t it sound like a distortion to say of someone (say, some close friend of yours) that she just happens to desire these things?  If someone desires friendship, we would never say: ‘Yet another willy-nilly desire of hers – no telling what will come next.’  On the contrary, we would say: ‘Not surprising – who doesn’t desire friendship?’  My point here, then, is that it seems that the desires for the basic goods just are present within individual humans, and stably so.  Indeed, it seems that the desires for the basic goods are built into humans.  After all, what would demand explanation is not someone’s desiring each of the basic goods, but rather someone’s failing to desire one or more of the basic goods. 
To be clear, by ‘desire’ I do not intend anything non-standard.  Earlier (see section 1) I indicated that desire theorists typically accept the following definition of ‘desire’: For A to desire X is for A to be intrinsically motivated to make X obtain; in other words, for A to desire X is for A to have some of her motivational force flowing to or directed at X itself.  I accept this view of what a desire is.  One immediate point to note, though, is that motivation-based views of desire (such as the one that I accept) can accommodate the claim that many desires are unfelt and, indeed, do not impinge upon one’s conscious awareness.  As Timothy Schroeder says with regard to standard motivation-based accounts of desire (such as the account that I accept): “it is an equally familiar claim made by the standard theory that desires need not appear in consciousness at all, as is the case with most of our standing desires (for the well-being of our loved ones, for example)” (2004, p. 15).​[13]​  This point about desires not appearing in consciousness matters for my argument, for I maintain that, although our desires for the basic goods are stably present within us, we neither feel them nor are conscious of them, except perhaps occasionally.  At least typically, then, we do not come to know about these desires through any sort of introspection.  Rather, at least typically, we come to know about them by observing that people in general (including ourselves) spend much of their lives pursuing instances of accomplishment, health, aesthetic experience, etc., and then by judging that the best explanation for this seems to be that people in general (including ourselves) have the desires for accomplishment, health, aesthetic experience, etc., built into them.  
One may object: ‘To desire to write a good philosophy book is to desire an instance of accomplishment.  But that is not the same as desiring accomplishment.  This matters.  For, while it is true that people in general spend much of their lives pursuing instances of the basic goods, and while it is right to infer that people in general desire instances of the basic goods, it is not right to infer that people in general desire the basic goods.’  Here, though, we should ask why people in general spend so much of their lives pursuing instances of the basic goods.  Consider an example: Someone gets on the subway to get to the museum; he goes to the museum because he wants to see some beautiful paintings; and he wants to see some beautiful paintings because he wants to experience beauty.  Or again, this same man flies on a plane to get to the mountains; he goes to the mountains because he wants to see their beauty; and he wants to see their beauty because he wants to experience beauty.  These are perfectly natural chains of explanation for action, and each one terminates with a reference to this man’s desire for aesthetic experience.  This man’s desire for aesthetic experience helps to explain his various pursuits of, and desires for, instances of aesthetic experience.  These various pursuits and desires are not sharply disconnected from one another.  They have a certain unity to them, and this is so because they flow out of something more general, namely, this person’s desire for aesthetic experience.  And, speaking generally, this seems to be how we humans operate: Our various pursuits of, and desires for, instances of the basic goods seem to be best explained as flowing out of our desires for the basic goods.​[14]​  
Again, though, one may object: ‘Your view is that A stably desires, say, accomplishment, and that A’s desires for various instances of accomplishment are best explained as flowing out of A’s general desire for accomplishment.  But isn’t it simpler or more parsimonious just to say that A desires various states of affairs that, for him, fall under accomplishment?’
I accept that, when it comes to desire-ascription, we should be parsimonious – we should ascribe desires to an agent only if we must.  But still, we must explain all that needs to be explained.  Just about everyone spends a great deal of their lives going around trying to get instances of health, accomplishment, friendship, etc., for themselves.  We must explain this fact.  Here we might try to say that we desire instances of the basic goods one-by-one, piecemeal, without any overarching unity involved, etc.  However, this explanation makes the relatively widespread and thoroughgoing human pursuit of instances of the basic goods seem to be more of a happenstance – more of a mere coincidence – than it really is.  The better explanation here, it seems, is the one that says that we desire various instances of the basic goods because our desires for various instances of these goods flow out of more general desires that we have (that is, more general desires that are simply built into us). 
If you still have doubts about the claim that, at least in the standard cases, humans have the desires for the basic goods built into themselves, then I urge you to consider yourself: Don’t you desire friendship, accomplishment, aesthetic experience, etc.?  And aren’t your desires for these goods stably present?  Put differently, do you not have a stable disposition, or tendency, or inclination to bring it about that you engage in friendship, that you engage in accomplishment, etc.?  Also, I urge you to consider others (say, people that you know well): Don’t they desire friendship, accomplishment, aesthetic experience, etc., and stably so?
One might wonder about the metaphysics that underlies all of this.  But I will leave that open.  Maybe humans in general have the desires for the basic goods built into them at least largely because of the way that evolution has gone.  And there are other possible metaphysical explanations.  Speaking generally, this is an important question, but I will not grapple with it here.  
Stepping back now, if the argument of this section has been correct, then normally functioning humans have the desires for the basic goods built into them.  So, if the argument of this section has been correct, the missing desires objection to the DO theory does not even apply (or is not even relevant) in the case of normally functioning humans.  Of course, the argument of this section has focused only on standard cases (or only on cases involving normally functioning humans), and we must also make sure to consider non-standard cases.  Let us do that now.

4. Non-standard cases
Earlier (see section 1) I brought up the non-fantasticality constraint, which says that we are allowed to appeal to a given case only if we have good evidence that it can occur in our world or environment or, more generally, in a world or environment that is relevantly like ours (one where the same laws of nature are operative, and where the history is substantially similar).  I will here be assuming that this constraint still applies.  Thus I will here be bracketing all non-standard cases that are fantastical.  
Another note about my methodology is in order.  We might say: ‘If there is a (non-fantastical) non-standard case that involves someone who seemingly never pursues friendship, then we should hold that this person must not desire friendship – or, at any rate, the burden of proof should be on those who claim that this person desires friendship, since, by all appearances, this person does not desire friendship.’  I disagree with this way of thinking.  If we consider people in general, then it certainly seems as though they desire friendship, accomplishment, aesthetic experience, etc., and stably so.  I start, then, by assuming that people have the desires for the basic goods built into them; and, for any given case, I will give this assumption the benefit of the doubt.  For many (non-fantastical) non-standard cases, then, my strategy will be to show that we can convincingly explain what is happening without giving up the assumption that the human in question stably desires all of the basic goods.  I must admit, though, that there are some very rare (non-fantastical) non-standard cases that involve humans who lack the desire for one or more of the basic goods.  With respect to these very rare cases, then, I will employ a different strategy: I will argue that we do not have compelling reasons for thinking that the non-desired basic good in question really is part of the welfare of the human in question.
We can begin by discussing the case of the extreme introvert.  The objection from OL theorists here is this.  ‘Consider an extreme introvert who spends her days alone.  Since she never or almost never pursues instances of friendship, she must not desire friendship.  But, if she does not desire friendship, then, according to the DP theory, friendship is not part of her welfare.  Yet that is deeply implausible, for surely engaging in friendship advances her well-being.’  
Is this case fantastical or non-fantastical?  The answer depends on how the details of the case are filled in.  Details should be filled in, for there should be some sort of an explanation for why the extreme introvert does not pursue instances of friendship.  If the details that are supplied are fanciful, then the case is fantastical and can be bracketed.  But, if the details that are supplied are non-fanciful, then the case is non-fantastical and so must be considered.  I contend that, if the details that are supplied are non-fanciful, then we will be able convincingly to explain the extreme introvert’s non-pursuit of friendship without giving up the assumption that she desires friendship.  But what would some non-fanciful details look like?  
Here the following remarks are in order.  Friends sometimes hurt (betray, humiliate, etc.) each other.  In short, when we pursue friendship, we open ourselves up to being burned.  Further, most of us, at least by adulthood, form more or less set routines (working, eating, sleeping, etc., routines).  And, of course, we sometimes feel pressure from our spouses, children, relatives, and other friends to alter our routines.  Maybe in the past our introvert has been badly burned by other people.  Or maybe she has extremely rigid routines and thus finds routine deviations extremely difficult.  Moreover, it may be that our introvert places a high emphasis on, say, accomplishment.  Indeed, it may be that she spends much of her life working (in solitude, apparently).  And, if one is pursuing something besides friendship, then (unless this other thing happens to line up with friendship) one is not going to be able to pursue friendship.  The point here, then, is this.  Even though our extreme introvert spends her days alone, it would be incautious of us to infer that she lacks the desire for friendship.  After all, it may well be that, although she really does desire friendship, she does not pursue it because she is averse (1) to some of its concomitants (say, to being vulnerable to being hurt by others or to changing her routines) or (2) to forsaking some other thing or things for its sake (for instance, to forsaking accomplishment for its sake).  
There are, however, some questions that arise here.  Why should we think that being vulnerable to being hurt by others is a concomitant of friendship?  And why should we think that changing one’s routines is a concomitant of friendship?  Isn’t it plausible to think that, rather than being concomitants of friendship, these things truly fall under friendship?  
As far as the ordinary language usage of ‘friendship’ goes, yes, it is plausible to think that these things truly fall under friendship (and thus are not concomitants of it).  However, it must here be said that OL theorists and I use ‘friendship’ (and also ‘accomplishment’, ‘aesthetic experience’, etc.) in a way that is narrower than the ordinary language usage.  An example will help.  Suppose that I am attending a college football game with my friend Joe, that it is raining and cold, and that I am run down (physically).  In this case the state of affairs my spending time with my friend Joe is an instance of friendship for me; and so, according to OL theorists, this state of affairs is an aspect of my welfare.  However, the experience taken as a whole includes more than just the state of affairs my spending time with my friend Joe.  For instance, the experience taken as a whole also includes the state of affairs my spending time in cold rain when I am run down.  It may well be, then, that the experience taken as a whole is not intrinsically good for me (or does not add to my welfare).  One may quibble with some of the details here, but the general point is clear enough: Certain states of affairs do, and certain states of affairs do not, truly fall under friendship.  Gomez-Lobo is an OL theorist who discusses this matter by way of bringing up the example of bacteria in a glass of water (2002, pp. 35-37).  The bacteria are not internal to the H2O molecules; they are external to them.  Similarly, although instances of friendship are often surrounded by states of affairs that are not intrinsically good for one, such states of affairs are external to instances of friendship – that is to say, such states of affairs do not truly fall under friendship.
Returning now to our extreme introvert, we can say that, even if she is averse to being vulnerable to being hurt by others or to changing her routines, it does not follow that she is averse to friendship or to any of those very narrow (or very fine-grained) states of affairs that, for her, fall under friendship.  All that follows is that she is averse to some concomitant or concomitants of friendship (or, in other words, to some states of affairs that surround those states of affairs that are, for her, instances of friendship).  
Moreover, with this last point in place, we can reaffirm what was said above.  It is plausible to think that our extreme introvert does desire friendship and that her non-pursuit of it results not from her being averse to it, but rather from her being averse (1) to some concomitants of it (say, to being vulnerable to being hurt by others or to changing her routines) or (2) to forsaking some other thing or things for its sake (for instance, to forsaking accomplishment for its sake).
Non-standard cases that are non-fantastical and that involve people who seemingly never pursue, say, accomplishment can be handled similarly: Once the non-fanciful details of these cases are provided, we will be able convincingly to explain these people’s non-pursuit of accomplishment without giving up the assumption that these people desire accomplishment.  Consider that many athletes must train painfully hard, many students must study painfully hard, many people working at their job must work painfully hard, etc., in order to get accomplishment for themselves.  This raises the question: Is it worth it on the whole to pursue accomplishment?  Many people (in many cases) answer no, but that does not show that these people lack the desire for accomplishment.  After all, it makes sense to think that these people really do desire accomplishment, but that they do not pursue it simply because they are averse (1) to some of its concomitants (say, to fighting fatigue, or stress, or pain) or (2) to forsaking some other thing or things for its sake (say, to forsaking time spent with friends for its sake).​[15]​  
Now consider that someone might say: ‘I can agree with what you have been saying so far.  It does seem right to think that the vast majority of people stably desire the basic goods.  But you have been avoiding the hardest cases: psychological disorder cases.  It is incredibly difficult to believe that the depressed person who lies in bed all day desires accomplishment, or that those with anorexia or bulimia desire health, or that those with severe autism desire friendship.’  
I will now briefly discuss depression, eating disorders, and autism.  These are not the only cases that might be discussed here.  Consider my discussion of depression, eating disorders, and autism to provide us with a model of what I might say about certain other (non-fantastical) non-standard cases.
Depression: Depressed people feel horrible (physically) – so horrible, in fact, that even performing the most minor of activities (getting out of bed, getting dressed, etc.) can be terribly burdensome.​[16]​  Furthermore, those with depression tend to have distorted beliefs.  They tend to take an unduly pessimistic view of themselves, their personal worlds, and their prospects for the future (Solomon and Haaga 2004, p. 23).  Cognitive therapies for depression (which have been shown to be quite effective) have the aim of helping depressed people to stop engaging in cognitive distortions.​[17]​  Now consider the following contrast.  The non-depressed college student believes that going to her afternoon class today (say, even though she has a very bad cold) will pay off.  She thinks that, although it will be extremely unpleasant (because she feels so horrible), it will still be worth it to go, since going will help her in keeping up with the course material.  Not so with the depressed college student – he tends to view his going to his afternoon class today not only as something that is extremely unpleasant (because he feels so horrible), but also as something that is largely an exercise in futility (say, because he believes that he is generally incompetent and is probably going to end up failing the course anyway).  The general point that I am driving at here is that depression does not extirpate one’s built-in desire for accomplishment.  ‘But, if the severely depressed person wants accomplishment, why does he lie in bed all day rather than going out and pursuing instances of accomplishment?’  It is sensible to think that his non-pursuit of accomplishment results from (1) his acting on desires that are significantly more pressing than his desire for accomplishment (if he is like many depressives, he will often be acting on a pressing desire to avoid further pain – say, further pain that might be incurred by performing even minor activities like getting out of bed) and (2) his believing that, even if he were to pursue instances of accomplishment, his actions would likely be ineffective in helping him to get such instances.​[18]​  
Eating disorders: Do anorexics and bulimics desire health?  Yes, they do.  Their health problems (inability to menstruate, loss of energy, inability to stay warm, etc.) result not from their desiring to have them, but rather from (1) their having and acting on the desire to be very thin and (2) their having distorted beliefs about eating, weight gain, and their own bodies.​[19]​  Here one may object.  ‘The anorexic, say, desires to be very thin – indeed, abnormally thin.  So she obviously lacks the desire to be of a healthy weight.  But being of a healthy weight is itself a large part of being healthy.  So how can you be so sure that the anorexic desires health?’  
This objection is confused.  Weight-wise, the anorexic wants to be very thin.  However, she still wants to be in the range of healthy and normal.  She most definitely does not want to be in the range of disordered, unhealthy, abnormal, emaciated, etc.​[20]​  ‘But why, then, does she allow herself to become or to remain abnormally thin, emaciated, etc.?’  The problem here is essentially cognitive.  When we look at the anorexic, we correctly see (or believe) that she is abnormally thin, emaciated, etc.  But that is not what she sees (or believes).  Indeed, from her own point of view, she is (weight-wise) either right or close to right (that is, very thin, but still in the range of healthy and normal) or maybe even overweight.  Sadly, one of the main symptoms of anorexia is “disturbance in body image, for example, seeing one’s self as fat even when one is bone thin or emaciated” (Kinoy, Holman, and Lemberg 1999, p. 2).
So far I have argued that we can convincingly explain what is happening in the above cases without giving up the assumption that the human in question is just like everybody else in that she stably desires all of the basic goods.  It is doubtful, though, that all (non-fantastical) non-standard cases can be handled in this way.  Here, for instance, consider autism.
Autism: Autistics have serious social know-how problems.  High functioning autistics such as Temple Grandin and Donna Williams have written about this matter.  Grandin says:
I am like the lady referred to as S. M. in a recent paper by Antonio Damasio…She has a damaged amygdala.  This part of the brain is immature in autism.  S. M. has difficulty judging the intentions of others, and she makes poor social judgments.  She is unable to recognize subtle changes in facial expression, which is common in people with autism…I have learned how to understand simple emotional relationships that occur with clients.  These relationships are usually straightforward; however, emotional nuances are still incomprehensible to me…I still have difficulty understanding and having a relationship with people whose primary motivation in life is governed by complex emotions, as mine are guided by intellect.  This has caused friction between me and my family members when I failed to read subtle emotional cues…My job and career make life worth living.  Intellectual complexity has replaced emotional complexity in my life (2006, pp. 79-80).
In reading Grandin and Williams it is clear that they sometimes avoid other people because they believe that, if they were to interact with others, this would result in awkwardness or friction.  As Williams notes, “fear” and “defensiveness” often lead her to reject social invitations to hang out with others (1994, p. 78).​[21]​  In a letter to her doctor, Williams writes of the difficulties that she has in making friendships, and she ends the letter by saying: “Can you help me with this because I am slowly accepting that I want to make real friendships, and it hurts that I can’t get past step one?” (1994, p. 79).  So, even if the appearances suggest otherwise, there is reason to think that many autistics do desire friendship and would pursue it and engage in it in a clearer way if not for their grave social know-how problems.  As one recent article says: “Although many [autistic] individuals report that they have challenges when it comes to emotions, it is not an absence of interest in emotional interaction.  They continue to try to relate to others” (Donnellan, Leary, and Robledo 2006, p. 226).  And this is true with respect to Grandin and Williams: They do desire friendship and do engage in it, at least to a limited extent (for instance, with family members).  
However, as compared to many autistics, autistics such as Grandin and Williams are extremely proficient in terms of language and social capacities.  And, in truth, it is plausible to think that there are some severe autistics who are born without and never acquire any appreciable desire for friendship, not even after substantial treatment efforts are made.  Call these autistics friendship-less autistics.  To get a sense of what friendship-less autistics are like, consider a quote from Laura Schreibman, one where she discusses the social deficits of severely autistic children:
It is not uncommon to hear a mother report that as an infant her [autistic] child did not hold up his arms in anticipation of being picked up, did not look at her when held, or was “stiff” or “rigid” to hold…The parent may describe the slightly older child as not wanting to be held, cuddled, or kissed, sometimes actively resisting or avoiding expressions of affection or other social overtures.  Typically the child is not upset when the parent leaves or particularly happy when the parent returns after an absence; he seems, in fact, not to notice.  Children with autism usually do not come to the parent for comfort if frightened or injured, nor are they likely to be consoled by the parent’s efforts to comfort them.  The parents are not used as a “secure base” when the children are in new or strange settings.  Rather, the parents have to be very careful to keep the child close because if they become separated, the child most likely will not be distressed nor try to locate the parent…Many parents come to feel that their child does not love them or need them as people, but simply relates to them as objects that provide what the child wants…As one might expect from someone who is not socially involved, individuals with autism typically fail to show empathy or to understand the feelings of others…Autistic children are as unresponsive to their peers as to their parents.  Other children are typically ignored or actively avoided (2005, pp. 28-31).
The severely autistic children discussed in this quote do seem to lack any appreciable desire for friendship.  However, and this point is crucial, they also seem to lack any appreciable receptivity for friendship.  Indeed, they seem incapable of absorbing the love or friendship that others offer them.  What we can say, then, is this: Within friendship-less autistics there seems to be some sort of striking cognitive/emotional deficit that bars them from being able to participate in the realm of friendship in any appreciable way.​[22]​  
	This matters in answering the missing desires objection that is in question here.  Since friendship-less autistics lack the desire for friendship, the DO theory must say that friendship is not a component of the welfare of friendship-less autistics.  But OL theorists will object, for on their view friendship is a component of the welfare of all humans, without exception.  However, it seems that, intuitively or pre-theoretically, we are inclined to think that, in order for a certain good to be included within the content of someone’s welfare, this person must at least be capable of engaging in this good.  And, insofar as this is so, it seems that it that it is the DO theory, not the OL theory, that has things right when it comes to the case of friendship-less autistics and the good of friendship.  (Think of the point this way.  Friendship-less autistics lack the ability to engage in friendship.  But, if one cannot engage in a certain good, then this good cannot benefit one.  And, if this good cannot benefit one, then this good cannot be part of one’s welfare.  It follows that friendship cannot be part of the welfare of friendship-less autistics.)
OL theorists may protest: ‘But surely, all else equal, the lives of friendship-less autistics would be richer or fuller if they were to engage in friendship.  So surely friendship is part of the well-being of friendship-less autistics.’  But we should be careful here.  ‘All else equal, the lives of friendship-less autistics would be richer or fuller if they were to engage in friendship.’  This counterfactual might be true.  But, even if this counterfactual is true, it does not follow that friendship is part of the well-being of friendship-less autistics.  Suppose we say to you: ‘All else equal, your life would be richer or fuller if you were to engage in friendship.’  This seems true, and, in addition, you have the ability to engage in friendship.  So this counterfactual seems true, and it also seems to be directly relevant to the question of what is included within the content of your well-being, since, after all, it references a good that you have the capacity to engage in.  Or consider the extreme introvert.  Suppose we say to her: ‘All else equal, your life would be richer or fuller if you were to engage in friendship.’  This counterfactual seems true, and it also seems to be directly relevant to the question of what is included within the content of her well-being.  I say this because the extreme introvert has the ability to engage in friendship.  If she hangs out with other people, she will be able to absorb the friendship that they offer her.  She just chooses not to actualize this ability because she is averse to some concomitants of friendship or because she is averse to forsaking some other thing or things for its sake.  And the same sort of thing holds for the anorexic in relation to health, since she does have the ability to engage in health (say, to eat and in turn to gain weight).  Matters seem different, though, when we turn to friendship-less autistics and the good of friendship.  Suppose we say to a friendship-less autistic: ‘All else equal, your life would be richer or fuller if you were to engage in friendship.’  This counterfactual might be true, but, regardless, it does not seem to be directly relevant to the question of what is included within the content of this friendship-less autistic’s well-being.  After all, this counterfactual does not reference a good that this friendship-less autistic has the ability to engage in.  In sum, then, friendship-less autistics cannot engage in friendship; and, since one cannot benefit from a good that one cannot engage in, it follows that, even if it is true that the lives of friendship-less autistics would be richer or fuller if they were to engage in friendship, friendship nonetheless is not part of the well-being of friendship-less autistics.  
	In making one last point here, let me appeal to the notion of actualizing one’s potential.  One thing that bothers OL theorists about welfare hedonism – the view that A’s welfare consists in, and only in, A’s experience of pleasure or enjoyment – is that it seems to allow that someone who has a great deal of unactualized potential might nonetheless live a life that is quite high in well-being.  If, in living out his life, someone focuses above all else on the actualization of his ability to experience pleasure or enjoyment, and if this same person for the most part neglects to exercise or to actualize his ability to engage in accomplishment, his ability to develop and to participate in deep personal relationships, his ability to experience the rich beauty that the world has to offer, etc., then, from the point of view of OL theorists, this person will have a good deal of unactualized potential in relation to accomplishment, friendship, aesthetic experience, etc.  This person’s life will therefore not be what it could be in terms of well-being.  This person could be living a better life, a richer or fuller life, for himself.  But he has chosen to live a more limited life, one that is not as high in well-being.  That, or something close to that, seems to capture some of the main intuitions that OL theorists have about well-being.  And, to be sure, the thought ‘this human’s well-being would increase if he were to do a better job of actualizing the potential that he has in relation to accomplishment, friendship, aesthetic experience, etc.’ is, at least in most cases, an eminently sensible thought.  But, in the case of friendship-less autistics and the good of friendship, thinking in terms of actualizing one’s potential in relation to friendship does not push us toward the conclusion that friendship is part of the well-being of friendship-less autistics, for friendship-less autistics do not seem to have the potential to engage in friendship.
Summing up: Here in section 4 we have considered the missing desires objection in relation to (non-fantastical) non-standard cases.  Regarding some of these cases, I have argued that, against the initial appearances, the human in question (be she the extreme introvert, or the depressive, etc.) actually does desire the basic good in question.  With regard to these cases, then, the missing desires objection is not even applicable (or is not even relevant).  Regarding the case of friendship-less autistics, I have argued that, although friendship-less autistics do lack the desire for the basic good of friendship, we do not have sufficient reasons for thinking that friendship really is part of the welfare of friendship-less autistics.  No doubt there are some (non-fantastical) non-standard cases that I did not discuss here in section 4.  But, speaking generally, it seems that, in light of the arguments offered in sections 3 and 4, we have good reason to believe that the DO theory can fend off any and all missing desires objections that OL theorists might level against it.  

5. Conclusion
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^1	  To be clear, I define objective values as values that are irreducible to mental states (such as desires, or feelings of pleasure, or attitudes of approval).  Regarding the objective value constraint, there are multiple options available to the hybrid theorist.  Adams appeals to the excellent, which is a Platonic sort of objective value (1999, pp. 93-101).  Darwall appeals to agent-neutral objective values (2002, pp. 73-104).  One might appeal to a generic or unspecified sort of objective value, as both Parfit (1984, pp. 501-502) and Olsaretti (2005, pp. 89-108) seem to do.  Yet another move, one that I find attractive, is to appeal to perfectionist value.  In this paper I will advance a hybrid theory (see section 2), but I will not specify the sort of objective value that I am appealing to, since arguing for any given specification would take more space than I have here.  In effect, then, I will appeal to a generic sort of objective value, just as Parfit and Olsaretti seem to do.  Regarding the pro-attitude constraint, a hybrid theorist might appeal to enjoyment, as Adams does (1999, pp. 93-101), or to desire, as Griffin does (1986, pp. 26-34), or to appreciation, as Darwall does (2002, pp. 73-104), or to some other sort of pro-attitude.  I will appeal to desire.
^2	  Finnis is one OL theorist who refers to the goods on the list as the basic goods (1980, pp. 81-99).  And there are many other OL theorists who do the same (for instance, see Murphy 2001, pp. 6-138).
^3	  For a very brief (and often quoted) discussion of prudential internalism, see Railton (2003, p. 47).  And, for an extended discussion of prudential internalism, see Rosati (1996, pp. 297-326).     
^4	  I should note, too, that both actual and hypothetical desire theories can be formulated such that they rely on second-order rather than first-order desires.  And, aside from the move to second-order desires, there are various other modifications that can be made to both actual and hypothetical desire theories.  
^5	  See Schroeder (2004, pp. 10-37) for a helpful discussion of motivation-based views of desire.  (Schroeder himself actually rejects motivation-based views of desire in favor of a certain reward-based view of desire.)
^6	  Interestingly, it has been shown, via the performing of certain experiments, that many autistic children who engage in self-injurious behavior do not do this for its own sake – rather, they do this simply for the sake of getting social attention.  For a discussion of this matter, see Schreibman (2005, pp. 139-141).
^7	  Heathwood has discussed some of these responses (2005, pp. 487-504).
^8	  For a prominent example of a hypothetical DF theory, see Railton (2003, pp. 43-68).  (I should perhaps stress that Railton relies on second-order hypothetical desires rather than first-order hypothetical desires.)
^9	  For a discussion of whether racist desires would extinguish in the face of one’s being fully and vividly informed, see Brink (1989, pp. 229-230).
^10	  Railton is explicit that the non-belief properties of an individual are to be held constant (or as near as possible to constant) as she is being fully and vividly informed (2003, p. 58).
^11	  There are certain moves that hypothetical desire theorists might make here – certain moves, that is, that are intended to lessen the severity of the problem of the personalities-gap between HA and A.  For a thorough discussion of this whole issue, see Rosati (1995, pp. 296-325).
^12	  I am inclined to think of the basic goods as, in the first instance, being perfectionist goods (see what I say above in n. 1).  But, for the purposes of this paper, it seems best to fill out the objective value constraint of the DO theory in terms of a generic or unspecified sort of objective value.  Appealing to a generic sort of objective value when advancing a hybrid theory is common: Parfit does this (1984, pp. 501-502); Griffin does this (1986, pp. 26-34); Olsaretti does this (2005, pp. 89-108); and many others also do this.
^13	  As I noted above (see n. 5), Schroeder himself actually rejects standard motivation-based views of desire in favor of a certain reward-based view of desire.
^14	  I should stress that my claim is not that, in virtue of A’s desiring, say, accomplishment, A also desires everything that instantiates accomplishment for herself.  One can desire accomplishment; her desires for various states of affairs that instantiate accomplishment for herself can flow out of her general desire for accomplishment; and yet, for various states of affairs that instantiate accomplishment for herself, it may well be that she has no desire for them (say, simply because she does not know about them).
^15	  One objection to what I am saying here is this: ‘Fatigue, stress, and pain are internal to or essential to accomplishment.  Therefore it is a distortion to say that fatigue, stress, and pain are mere concomitants of accomplishment.’  My response here is that it is not essential to something’s being an accomplishment that it involve fatigue, stress, or pain.  Great athletes perform great feats quite effortlessly (think of Michael Jordan hitting a fade-away jumper), and great philosophers give great lectures quite effortlessly.  There is no fatigue, stress, or pain present when they perform these feats.  I am not denying that there was plenty of fatigue, stress, and pain that led up to their being able to do these things quite effortlessly.  I am sure that Michael Jordan worked hard for many years on his fade-away jumper, and I am sure that great philosophers work hard for many years before they are able to give great lectures quite effortlessly.  My point is simply that accomplishment, taken in and of itself, does not involve fatigue, stress, or pain – these things are, then, mere concomitants of accomplishment.  Again, I should emphasize that my usage (and also the OL theorist usage) of ‘accomplishment’, ‘knowledge’, ‘friendship’, etc., is narrower than the ordinary language usage of these terms.  The ordinary language usage of ‘accomplishment’ may well entail that, at least for various sorts of accomplishment, there is fatigue, stress, or pain that is essentially involved.   
^16	  Gilbert notes that, when one is depressed, each day “can be a torment of having to force ourselves to perform even the most minor of activities” (2001, p. 4).
^17	  For a good discussion of how cognitive therapies for depression generally work, see Hollon (2006, pp. 133-152).  Also, for a discussion of the empirical evidence that has shown that cognitive therapies for depression are quite effective, see Hollon (2006, p. 147).
^18	  My view, then, is that there are two major difficulties that the depressed person faces: a physical feeling problem, which medication can help with, and a cognitive problem, where this includes his having lost his belief in or faith in the efficacy of his own actions.  Further, my view is that the person who is depressed and lying in bed all day does want knowledge, accomplishment, etc. – but he feels physically terrible and, in addition, does not believe that getting out of bed and going through the day will actually help him in getting the things that he wants (he may well think to himself that nothing he does “works”).
^19	  Regarding distorted beliefs, consider Tracy (an anorexic): “Tracy took more than one and a half years to reach her target weight [of 122 pounds].  She would gain and lose.  For a long time, she described her food intake as ‘huge,’ when in fact she was eating under 2,000 calories per day (on which she could not gain)” (Wagner 1999, p. 107).
^20	  What the anorexic wants is a perfect body: “A desire to perfect one’s self through one’s body, and by extension in every other way, is also a strong characteristic and can supersede the reality of body structure and function, resulting in a distorted body image” (Kinoy, Holman, and Lemberg 1999, p. 2).
^21	  With respect to avoiding other people, Grandin writes that, during her years of puberty, the teasing from other kids at school “was very painful” and that just the threat of teasing made her so fearful that she was “afraid to walk across the [school] parking lot because [she] was afraid somebody would call [her] a name” (2006, p. 78).    
^22	  The point here can be put in terms of the ability to be emotionally moved by others.  In claiming (as I am) that friendship-less autistics lack the ability to engage in friendship, I am thinking that, in order truly to be able to engage in friendship, you must have the ability to link the thoughts or emotions of others to yourself in such a way that you are appreciably emotionally moved by these others.  Friendship-less autistics seem to lack this particular ability (and hence seem to lack the ability to engage in friendship).  In making this point I am drawing on an article about autism by Peter Hobson: “On Being Moved in Thought and Feeling: An Approach to Autism” (2007, pp. 139-154).    
